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Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights
in the Wake of Citizens United
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer

ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Citizens United v. FEC provided corporations with the highest
level of First Amendment speech protection, at least in the context of election-related speech. On its face, this
strong level of protection would seem to throw into doubt the speech-related restrictions federal tax law imposes
on charities, including the limits on lobbying. There are, however, at least two reasons to believe this conclusion
is incorrect. First, the effect of the Citizens United holding on the lobbying limits for charities is unclear because
of the Supreme Court’s identification of a government subsidy—in the form of tax benefits—in the charity context. Second, the Court’s related decision to conclude that a charity’s First Amendment rights are sufficiently
vindicated by the ability to speak through the alternate channel of a non-charitable affiliate further complicates
the analysis. At the same time, however, these complications provide grounds for considering whether a more
nuanced, ‘‘institutional rights’’ approach to First Amendment speech protection is appropriate in the context of
lobbying by charities and perhaps also in other ‘‘subsidy’’ contexts. Part I of this article briefly reviews both the
federal tax law limits on lobbying by charities and the Supreme Court’s basis for concluding that the limits are
constitutional. Part II then reviews the Citizens United decision and why that decision is unlikely to have an
immediate effect on the viability of those limits. Finally, Part III considers how both the Citizens United decision
and a broader institutional rights perspective may instead affect the ability of the federal government to restrict
the relationships between charities and their non-charitable affiliates that engage in lobbying, as well as affecting
other contexts where the government places speech-related conditions on the provision of government subsidies.

INTRODUCTION

1

130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
See id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (‘‘The conceit that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the
political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case.’’); see, e.g., Posting of
Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/
2010/01/analysis-the-personhood-of-corporations/ ( Jan. 21,
2010, 18:45 EST) (‘‘If anything, the decision in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission conferred new dignity on corporate ‘persons,’ treating them—under the First Amendment
free-speech clause—as the equal of human beings.’’); Posting
of Doug Kendall to The Huffington Post ( Jan. 21, 2010, 16:27
EST) (‘‘the Court’s conservative majority re-wrote the Constitution to give corporations . the same right to influence the electoral process as ‘We the People’’’); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, A Bad
Call on Campaign Finance, CNN, Jan. 21, 2010, http://
www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/01/21/torres.spelliscy.supreme
.court.campaign.finance/ (Citizens United ‘‘granted corporations the same speech rights enjoyed by living, breathing
persons’’).
2

T

he Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Citizens United v. FEC1 provided corporations
with the highest level of First Amendment speech
protection, at least in the context of election-related
speech.2 On its face, this strong level of protection
would seem to throw into doubt the speech-related
restrictions federal tax law imposes on charities,
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including the limits on lobbying.3 There are, however, at least two reasons to believe this conclusion
is incorrect.
First, the effect of the Citizens United holding on
the lobbying limits for charities is unclear because
of the Supreme Court’s identification of a government subsidy—in the form of tax benefits—in the
charity context.4 Second, the Court’s related decision
to conclude that a charity’s First Amendment rights
are sufficiently vindicated by the ability to speak
through the alternate channel of a non-charitable
affiliate further complicates the analysis.5 At the
same time, however, these complications provide
grounds for considering whether a more nuanced,
‘‘institutional rights’’ approach to First Amendment
speech protection is appropriate in the context of
lobbying by charities and perhaps also in other
‘‘subsidy’’ contexts.6
Part I of this article briefly reviews both the federal
tax law limits on lobbying by charities and the
Supreme Court’s basis for concluding that the limits
are constitutional. Part II then reviews the Citizens
United decision and why that decision is unlikely
to have an immediate effect on the viability of
those limits. Finally, Part III considers how both
the Citizens United decision and a broader institutional rights perspective may instead affect the ability
of the federal government to restrict the relationships
between charities and their non-charitable affiliates that engage in lobbying, as well as affecting
other contexts where the government places speechrelated conditions on the provision of government
subsidies.

I. CHARITIES AND LOBBYING
There is a long history of charitable organizations
engaging in efforts to shape public policy, including
legislation. That said, there is almost as long a history of the law limiting such attempts. This part
reviews both those limits and the court challenges
to them.
A. Limits on charity lobbying
To understand the limits on lobbying by charities,
it is necessary to define ‘‘charity’’ and ‘‘lobbying,’’
and to explore how charities engage in advocacy
even with these limits in place.

1. Definitions. For purposes of this discussion,
a ‘‘charity’’ is a legal entity that both is exempt
from federal income tax because it is described in
Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) and is eligible to receive tax deductible charitable contributions because it is described in Code section
170(c)(2).7 Charities are therefore a subset of the
category ‘‘tax-exempt’’ or ‘‘exempt’’ organizations,
which category includes all organizations that are
exempt from federal income tax whether or not
eligible to receive tax deductible charitable contributions.8 Examples of non-charity exempt organizations include unions, trade associations, and the
recently created nonprofit health insurance provider
option.9 Tax-exempt organizations are in turn a subset of the category ‘‘nonprofit’’ or ‘‘not-for-profit’’
organizations, which includes all entities that
under state law do not have owners with a right to
the distribution of profits whether or not exempt
from federal income tax.10
The term ‘‘lobbying,’’ as used by the federal tax
law with respect to charities, means attempting
‘‘to influence legislation’’11 although, as detailed
later in this section, federal tax law actually provides two overlapping but different definitions of
attempting to influence legislation.12 Lobbying
therefore generally includes any attempt, direct or
indirect, to affect a bill, resolution, decree, or
other action by a legislative body, as well as any
attempt to affect a ballot initiative, referendum, or

3

See I.R.C. x 501(c)(3) (2006) (as a condition for exemption
from federal income tax, subjecting entities organized and operated for charitable, educational, or other listed purposes to limits on both attempting to influence legislation and participating
in political campaigns); id. x 170(c)(2)(D) (2006) (same limitations on the same types of entities as a condition for eligibility
to receive tax deductible charitable contributions).
4
See Taxation with Representation v. Regan, 461 U.S. 540, 544
(1983).
5
See id. at 544 n.6, 553–54 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
6
See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 Iowa
L. Rev. 736 (1995); Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54
UCLA L. Rev. 1497 (2007); Frederick Schauer, Principles,
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 84
(1998).
7
See I.R.C. xx 170(c)(2), 501(c)(3) (2006).
8
See I.R.C. x 501(a), (c) (West 2010).
9
See I.R.C. x 501(c)(5), (6), (29) (West 2010).
10
See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89
Yale L.J. 835, 838 (1980) (describing this ‘‘nondistribution
constraint’’ as the key characteristic of nonprofits).
11
See I.R.C. xx 170(c)(2), 501(c)(3) (2006).
12
See infra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
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constitutional amendment that is subject to public
vote.13 These definitions do not treat as lobbying
any communications with executive branch officials
(unless aimed at influencing legislation), litigation
or other interactions with judicial branch officials,
or education of the public about policy issues (unless such education is an indirect attempt to influence legislation).
2. Limits. As others have detailed, the limits on

lobbying by charities is essentially a story of ‘‘charity good’’ (insert picture of charity leader with halo
and wings here), ‘‘lobbying bad’’ (insert picture of
lobbyist with horns and a pitchfork here), and therefore (too much) lobbying by charities is bad.14 After
the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code, the
first notable mention of such a limit by the courts
was in the 1930 Slee decision authored by Learned
Hand.15 In upholding the IRS’s decision to deny
charity status to the American Birth Control
League, the court characterized the organization’s
attempts to seek repeal or amendment of laws that
addressed the prevention of conceptions as ‘‘[p]olitical agitation.’’16 It concluded that such activity ‘‘is
outside the scope of the statute’’ that provided for
federal income tax exemption for organizations ‘‘organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes.’’17
Apparently viewing this and similar decisions as
not providing a sufficient barrier to charities engaging in lobbying, Congress in 1934 amended federal
law to explicitly prohibit charities from engaging in
lobbying as a ‘‘substantial part’’ of their activities.18
While apparently motivated primarily by a concern
that charities would otherwise have their lobbying
co-opted by parties seeking personal benefit, the
statutory language reached all lobbying activities
regardless of motivation.19 Thirty-five years later,
Congress further amended the laws to prohibit all
lobbying by a subset of charities labeled private
foundations, which generally rely on a single or
small group of donors for their financial support
and do not engage in activities such as operating a
church, hospital, or school that Congress viewed
as making them accountable to the public.20
Charities struggled against these limits, especially as government activity in areas of concern
to them grew. Some organizations lost their charitable status as a result, most prominently the Sierra
Club.21 Others sought a liberalization of the existing
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limits, an effort that was partially successful when
Congress in 1976 enacted an elective regime
under which charities would be subject to a specific
dollar limit on their lobbying as opposed to the
vague and uncertain substantial part standard.22
After some controversy, the Treasury Department
also issued regulations that provided very specific
and relatively narrow definitions of what constituted
‘‘direct’’ and ‘‘grassroots’’ lobbying for charities
that made this election, further freeing them from
the limits.23
Nevertheless, many charities continue to seek a
loosening of these limits. For example, the Center
for Lobbying in the Public Interest has long taken

13
See Treas. Reg. xx 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (flush language),
56.4911-2(d)(1)(i) (2010).
14
See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest:
Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code’s Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1269, 1282–83 (1993) (noting
the historically assumed incompatibility of charity status and
seeking to influence legislation); see also Alyssa Battistoni,
Why Charities Should Be Political, Salon, (Sept. 9, 2010,
9:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/
2010/09/09/charities_politics (questioning the ‘‘simplistic’’
view that political involvement by charities, including lobbying, is ‘‘bad’’ while apolitical charitable activity is ‘‘good’’).
15
Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930). Prior to
Slee, the Treasury Department had promulgated a regulation
stating that disseminating controversial or partisan propaganda
was not ‘‘educational’’ within the meaning of the charitable
contribution deduction statute. T.C. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int.
Rev. 285 (1919).
16
Slee, 42 F.2d at 185.
17
Id. at 184, 185.
18
Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 74-216, x 23(o), 48 Stat.
680, 609 (1934).
19
78 Cong. Rec. 5861, 5959 (1934) (statement of Senator
David Reed).
20
See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, x 101(b), 83
Stat. 487, 512–14 (1969) (codified at I.R.C. x 4945(d)(1), (e)
(2006)); Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law 20 & n.55 (noting that congressional concern
about several Ford Foundation grants relating to school decentralization ‘‘legislation’’ may have been the impetus for this prohibition).
21
See IRS Fact Sheet, December 19, 1966, in 7 CCH 1967
Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. { 6376; IRS Proposes to Revoke Sierra
Club’s Eligibility to Receive Deductible Contributions Because
of the Club’s Political Activities, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1793
(1967).
22
See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, x
1307(a)(1), (b), 90 Stat. 1520, 1720–21, 1722–26 (1976) (codified as amended at I.R.C. xx 501(h), 4911 (2006)); Lauren
Brown Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching
the Rules to the Rationales, 63 Indiana L. Rev. 201, 221–26
(1987).
23
See T.D. 8308, 55 Fed. Reg. 35579-01 (1990) (codified as
amended primarily at Treas. Reg. xx 1.501(h)-1 to -3,
56.4911-0 to -10 (2010)).
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the position that these rules should be liberalized to
make it easier for charities to be involved politically.24 The possibility that newspapers and other news
outlets may seek refuge in charity status could also
put new pressure on these limits.25 At the same
time, recent criticism of lobbyists has renewed
attempts to tighten the limits on lobbying by charities, including charities that receive certain government funds.26 So while many charities choose not to
lobby at all, enough charities do lobby—including
such prominent and varied organizations as the
American Cancer Society, Focus on the Family,
and the NAACP—that pressures on these limits
continue.27
Current law does, however, offer a way for charities to lobby without limit. That way is to create an
affiliated, non-charity that while not eligible to
receive tax deductible contributions also is not subject to the lobbying limits imposed on charities. The
next section addresses the rules and burdens associated with having such an affiliate.
3. Non-charitable affiliates. The IRS has historically permitted charities to create closely affiliated
non-charitable but still tax-exempt entities to
engage in substantial lobbying and other activities
prohibited to charities. At first glance, the requirements for such a separate affiliate are relatively
light: separate legal status, most commonly separate
incorporation; a separate governing body but the
members of which may overlap, even entirely,
with the charity’s governing body; and separate
finances.28 At the same time, the charity and its
non-charitable affiliate may share staff, office
space, computer servers, and other resources as
long as each entity pays its fair share of the costs
for such shared resources.29 They may also have
similar Web sites, those Web sites may link to the
Web site of the other organization, and the affiliate
may have a similar name to that of the charity.30
In reality, however, the administrative burdens
can be significant. While judges and lawyers more
generally may view creating and maintaining a
separate legal entity as a relatively easy task, for
non-lawyers consistently satisfying the legal requirements that accompany a separate legal existence may be difficult. For example, creating a
tax-exempt nonprofit corporation requires choosing
a jurisdiction in which to incorporate, drafting
incorporation papers, bylaws, and organizational
resolutions, properly filing the incorporation papers,
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preparing and filing a lengthy and complicated
application form if IRS recognition of tax-exempt
status is desired, as it normally is, and preparing
and filing a variety of other state and sometimes
local forms. For a lay person without either access
to templates for these documents or knowledge of
the legal rules and reasons for the numerous provisions in them, this process can be quite challenging.

24

See Center for Lobbying in the Public Interest, What
We Do, CLPI Protects: Protecting and Expanding Nonprofit Lobbying Rights, http://www.clpi.org/about-us/
what-we-do (last visited July 7, 2011); see also Suzanne
Perry, Nonprofits Call for Changes to ‘‘Arcane’’ Lobbying
Rules, The Chronicle of Philanthropy Gov’t & Pol.
Watch Blog (Apr. 18, 2011, 9:52 PM), http://philanthropy.com/blogs/government-and-politics (Independent Sector, a
national coalition of charities and foundations, is calling for
changes to the rules limiting lobbying by charities; disclosure:
the author participated in the closed-door meeting discussed in
this blog post).
25
See Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Can Nonprofits Save Journalism? Legal Constraints and Opportunities, 65 Exempt Org.
Tax Rev. 463, 475 (2010).
26
See, e.g., GIVE Act, H.R. 1388, x 1304 (2009) (as passed by
the House, Mar. 18, 2009) (would have prohibited organizations
engaged in ‘‘legislative advocacy’’ from receiving certain
national service funding).
27
American Cancer Society, 2008 I.R.S. Form 990, Sch. A, at 6
(reporting over $11 million in lobbying expenditures in a single
year); Focus on the Family, 2009 I.R.S. Form 990, Sch. C, at 2
(reporting $1.65 million in lobbying expenditures over four
years); National Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People,
2009 I.R.S. Form 990, Sch. C, at 2 (reporting almost $2.3 million in lobbying expenditures over four years). These IRS filings are available at www.guidestar.org.
28
See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 n.6
(1983) (‘‘[t]he IRS apparently requires only that the two groups
be separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show
that tax deductible contributions are not used to pay for lobbying’’); see generally Ward L. Thomas & Judith E. Kindell,
Affiliations Among Political, Lobbying and Educational
Organizations, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS-TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2000, at 255 (2000),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopics00.pdf.
29
See Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year
Issues, Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional
Education Technical Instruction Program FY2002, at
335, 367–69 (2001) (describing the close relationship a charity
may have with its non-charitable affiliate that engages in lobbying or political campaign related activity).
30
See, e.g., Memorandum from Marsha Ramirez, Director,
Examinations, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division,
Internal Revenue Service et al. to Lois G. Lerner, Director,
Exempt Organizations, Internal Revenue Service et al. 3 (Apr.
17, 2008) (discussing hyperlinks between a charity’s Web site
and that of its non-charitable affiliate); Kindell & Reilly,
supra note 29, at 367 (stating that the similarity in names
between affiliated charitable and non-charitable tax-exempt
organizations will not, by itself, result in attribution of the
non-charitable organization’s activities to the charitable organization).
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Similarly, having staff carefully allocate both
expenses and time between two entities may be easier said than done, while splitting staff between the
two entities may raise a host of employment law
issues and splitting resources such as office space
and rented office equipment may create lease and
other contracting concerns. Even keeping Web
sites sufficiently separate may prove difficult.31
Legal burdens may also arise for non-charitable
affiliates that are not relevant for charities. For
example, gifts to charities are exempt from federal
gift tax while gifts to most such affiliates may be
subject to that tax, although there are a number of
arguments for why that may not be the case.32
The IRS requires significant disclosure of information about such affiliates on the charity’s annual
information return, and on the affiliate’s return
about the charity.33 If donors to an affiliate are
able to deduct their contributions as business
expenses, as is usually the case with trade associations, the affiliate also has to either pay a tax on
its lobbying expenditures or notify such donors
that a portion of their donations (based on the
amount of lobbying done by the affiliate) is not
deductible.34 Given these burdens, and the greater
ease with which charities can attract donations
(since they can offer donors the possibility of a
tax deduction), it is understandable both why charities seeking to lobby desire to loosen or eliminate
the current limits and why some charities choose
to curtail their lobbying rather than create noncharitable affiliates. Reducing the barriers to charities lobbying directly, as opposed to through
affiliates, may also be desirable because it would
encourage greater public policy input from charities, which often speak for marginalized or other
under-represented groups,35 although a more negative perspective would be that charities simply represent another set of ‘‘special interest’’ groups that
seek to have government favor one subset of the
population over the more general public good.36
The actual burden imposed on a charity by having to create a non-charitable affiliate to engage in
substantial lobbying is also important because of
the constitutional issues raised by the limits on charity lobbying. Those issues arise because the federal
government is conditioning receipt of a benefit—
the ability to receive tax deductible charitable
contributions—on surrendering the constitutionally
protected right to speak with respect to certain subjects, as detailed in the next section.
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B. Constitutionality of the limits
on charity lobbying
To understand both why the limits on lobbying by
charities raise a constitutional issue, and why—at
least before Citizens United—the limits survived
constitutional scrutiny, requires consideration of
the ‘‘unconstitutional conditions’’ doctrine and its
specific application to these limits.
1. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is deceptively simple. It provides that the government cannot do indirectly what it could not do directly.37
One of the clearest examples of such a situation
involved the denial of exemption from tax, although

31
See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2009-08-050 (Feb. 20,
2009) (finding prohibited political campaign intervention by a
charity when it failed to sufficiently distinguish Web pages containing candidate-related material from its other Web pages
even though its non-charitable affiliate was responsible for
those candidate-related Web pages).
32
See Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Drops Audits of Political Donors,
N.Y. Times, July 8, 2011, at B1 (the IRS announced it is dropping gift tax audits relating to donations to tax-exempt, noncharitable organizations pending further study of this issue
after congressional and public criticism of those audits); Barbara Rhomberg, Constitutional Issues Cloud the Gift Taxation
of Section 501(c)(4) Contributions, 15 Taxation of Exempts
176 ( Jan./Feb. 2004); Barbara Rhomberg, The Law Remains
Unsettled on Gift Taxation of Section 501(c)(4) Contributions,
15 Taxation of Exempts 62 (Sept./Oct. 2003).
33
See 2010 I.R.S. Form 990, Sch. R.
34
See I.R.C. xx 162(e), 6033 (2006); John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and Lobbying Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations,
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS-TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM FOR FY 2003, at L-1, L-19 to L-20 (2002), available at < http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf > .
35
See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing
v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981) (‘‘by collective efforts
individuals can make their views known, when, individually,
their voices would be faint or lost’’); Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public, Giving in America: Toward a
Stronger Voluntary Sector 43–44 (1975); Elizabeth T.
Boris, Introduction: Nonprofit Organizations in a DemocracyRoles and Responsibilities, in Nonprofits & Government:
Collaboration & Conflict (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene
Steuerle eds., 2d ed. 2008), at 1, 18.
36
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What is This ‘‘Lobbying’’ That We
Are So Worried About?, 26 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 485, 499–
501 (2008) (the current reason for the tax rules relating to lobbying, including both the limits on lobbying by charities and the
denial of a business expense deduction for lobbying expenditures, is a concern that without such limits charities and businesses would wield undue influence with respect to
government policy).
37
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1415 (1989).
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not from federal income tax but from state property
tax. In Speiser v. Randall, California assessors
denied a property-tax exemption to two veterans
based solely on the fact that the veterans refused
to execute a loyalty oath contained in the exemption
application.38 While the assessors argued that the
exemption was a ‘‘privilege’’ or ‘‘bounty’’ and so
its denial could not infringe speech, presumably
since the veterans only had to reject the benefit to
be free of the oath, the Court felt otherwise.39 It
characterized the denial of the exemption as a penalty on speech instead, and compared it to Congress
withdrawing mailing privileges as a penalty for
engaging in speech that Congress could not directly
limit consistent with the Constitution.40
Even this example highlights some of the problems with this doctrine, however. First, where is
the line between a ‘‘privilege’’ and a ‘‘penalty’’?
Why, for example, is an exemption from an otherwise generally applicable tax not best characterized
as the former instead of the denial of such an
exemption being characterized as the latter? And
should it matter? Second, what if, unlike the situation in Speiser, there is a relatively close relationship between the benefit at issue and the
challenged condition? For example, if the government provides funds for a public education program
is not the government able to control what is said as
part of that program?41 More controversially, what
if the government determines that legalizing prostitution will harm efforts to combat AIDS and so bars
groups that receive federal funding for AIDSrelated work from advocating such legalization,
even with private funds from other sources?42
These and similar problems have created a
cottage industry of trying to develop a coherent
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.43 Such efforts
have been less than satisfactory, however, leading
some scholars essentially to throw up their hands
and conclude that coherence is unattainable.44 The
Supreme Court in recent years also appears not to
have been very receptive to unconstitutional conditions arguments,45 although it has indicated that the
doctrine still has merit.46 Courts therefore continue
to have to struggle with the application of this
doctrine in situations ranging from the legalizing
prostitution example provided above to the provision of legal services to the poor.47 One area
where the courts have provided relative clarity,
however, is with respect to the limits on lobbying
by charities.

MAYER
2. Are the limits on charity lobbying an
unconstitutional condition? The lobbying limits

on charities, as well as the prohibition on charities
intervening in political campaigns, would seem to
be ripe for an unconstitutional condition challenge.
Here we have Congress doing indirectly something
it clearly could not do directly—forbidding a particular type of organization from engaging in a specific
type of speech—absent a sufficiently strong interest
for doing so (although how strong would depend on

38

357 U.S. 513, 514–15 (1958).
Id. at 518–19.
40
Id. at 518.
41
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987) (concluding that conditioning states’ receipt of certain federal highway funds on adoption of certain laws is constitutional in
certain circumstances, even though Congress could not constitutionally adopt such laws itself).
42
See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l v. U.S. Agency for Int’l
Dev., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13770 (2d Cir. July 6, 2011) (involving such restrictions).
43
See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 Geo.
L.J. 1 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, Forward: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Another View of
the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract
Theory, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 913 (2006); Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 371 (1995); Sullivan,
supra note 37.
44
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional
Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency,
72 Denv. U. L. Rev. 989 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism
(with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion),
70 B. U. L. Rev. 593 (1990).
45
See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Right,
547 U.S. 47, 59–60 (2006); United States v. American Library
Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 211–13 (2003); see also Christian Legal
Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (rejecting what
could be characterized as an unconstitutional conditions argument, although the Court found the most relevant precedents
to be those involving limited public fora). The case of Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez arguably involved an unconstitutional condition in the form of a limitation on Legal Services
Corporation-funded attorneys with respect to raising constitutional or statutory challenges to welfare laws in otherwise permitted cases involving individual welfare recipients, but in
striking down that limitation as unconstitutional the Supreme
Court relied primarily on the fact that the limitation distorted
the legal system and not on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine more generally. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531
U.S. 533, 544–48 (2001).
46
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 547–48 (2005)
(carefully distinguishing, as opposed to overruling or modifying, two cases that involved a ‘‘special application’’ of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
47
See supra note 42 and accompanying text; Brooklyn Legal
Serv. Corp. v. Legal Serv. Corp., 462 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006).
39
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the level of protection provided to this type of
speaker engaging in this type of speech, an issue
that will be considered later). At the very least,
therefore, it seems that Congress should have to provide a sufficiently strong justification for this condition on the ability to receive tax deductible
charitable contributions to overcome the free speech
concerns it raises.
When presented with this issue, however, the
Supreme Court found it relatively easy to uphold
the lobbying limits. To understand why, we have
to start with a decision that did not involve a charity.
In Cammarano v. United States, decided a little over
a year after Speiser, the Court faced the question of
whether the Treasury Department could deny taxpayers the ability to deduct lobbying expenses—in
this case relating to a ballot initiative—even if
those expenses otherwise qualified as ordinary and
necessary business expenses.48 After considering
at length various arguments relating to whether
the Treasury Department’s regulations reached the
expenses at issue (and concluding they did), the
Court briefly addressed a constitutional argument
based on Speiser. In a single paragraph, it concluded
that the denial of a deduction did not represent a
penalty on constitutionally protected activities but
only established that taxpayers be ‘‘required to
pay for those activities entirely out of their own
pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required to do under the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code.’’49 The Court distinguished
Speiser by noting that there California was trying to
suppress certain ideas it deemed dangerous, while in
this instance the denial reached attempts to influence the fate of legislation of all kinds.50 Writing
at greater length, Justice Douglas in concurrence
analogized the situation in Speiser to denying all
ordinary and necessary business deductions to taxpayers who engage in lobbying, which he found
would clearly be a penalty on the exercise of First
Amendment rights (and apparently an unconstitutional one at that), while the rules at issue in
Cammarano only denied a subsidy for lobbying
expenses by prohibiting the deduction of such
expenses.51 While not developed by Justice Douglas, his language suggests an analogy to government
placing speech-related conditions on the use of the
funds it itself provides, as opposed to conditions
on the use of funds from other, private sources.
This precedent planted the seeds for the failed
challenge by Taxation with Representation of
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Washington (TWR) to the prohibition on charities
making lobbying a ‘‘substantial part’’ of their activities.52 In that case, the Supreme Court found that
both tax exemption and deductibility of contributions were a form of subsidy, a subsidy which
TWR could have foregone if it had wanted to
engage in unlimited lobbying (indeed, TWR only
had to surrender the deductibility of contributions
since non-charity, tax-exempt organizations could
and still can engage in unlimited lobbying).53
Then, relying on Cammarano, the Court concluded
that the ‘‘substantial part’’ limit only had the effect
of denying this subsidy for lobbying activities and
did not impose a penalty on the exercise of constitutional rights, as was the case in Speiser, stating
flatly that ‘‘Congress has simply chosen not to pay
for TWR’s lobbying.’’54 Following this reasoning,
lower federal courts have also upheld the prohibition on charities engaging in political campaign
intervention.55
An important aspect of this decision, however,
was the ability of a charity to create a non-charitable
affiliate to engage in lobbying that exceeded the
level permitted for the charity.56 In his concurrence,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice
Blackmun emphasized that he agreed with the
Court’s conclusion only because of the ease with
which a charity could create and effectively speak
through (and with the non-deductible funds of)
such an affiliate.57 He concluded that restrictions
on the ability of charities to create and control
such affiliates ‘‘would render the statutory scheme
unconstitutional.’’58 While normally the view in a
concurrence would be owed little if any deference,
later decisions by the Court explicitly adopted
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358 U.S. 498, 499 (1959). For a broader discussion of Cammarano and related decisions, see Ellen Aprill, Regulating
the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations
After Citizens United, 10 Election L.J. 363 (2011).
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Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
50
Id.
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Id. at 515.
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Taxation with Representation v. Regan, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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Id. at 544.
54
Id. at 545–46.
55
See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d. 137 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
56
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544 n.6.
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Id. at 553–54.
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Id. at 554.
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Justice Blackmun’s reasoning.59 Likely for this reason, the IRS appears to have done so as well.60
So whatever the incoherence of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine generally, in this context existing
precedent was clear that Congress may deny the ‘‘subsidy’’ of a tax deduction for certain types of speech—
including lobbying—without running afoul of the
Constitution as long as the entities at issue, whether
businesses or charities, have a relatively easy way of
engaging in that speech using non-deductible funds.
For businesses that way is simply engaging in the lobbying without deducting the associated expenses. For
charities, that way is creating a closely affiliated noncharity. And so the law stood until the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Citizens United.
II. CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC
Citizens United involved a non-charity, taxexempt organization challenging not the federal
tax law limits but instead federal election law limits
on speech.61 The specific limits at issue prohibited
any corporation, including nonprofit corporations
such as Citizens United, from funding certain
election-related communications.62 While the
Supreme Court in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life (MCFL) had previously concluded that the
First Amendment required an exception to these
limits for certain types of nonprofit corporations,63
Citizens United did not fall within that exception
because it accepted contributions not only from
individuals but also from for-profit corporations.64
In one of the most significant campaign finance
decisions in decades, the closely divided Court in
Citizens United overturned two earlier decisions
and struck down those limits as unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.65 The reasoning and
breadth of the Court’s decision at first glance suggest that the speech-related limits on charities,
including the lobbying limits, are now newly
vulnerable to constitutional attack. A closer examination reveals, however, that the precedents upholding those limits are probably still good law. At the
same time, the Citizens United decision places
renewed emphasis on the importance of a (non-subsidized) avenue for otherwise limited speech.
A. The decision
For many decades, Congress and most state legislatures have treated corporations differently than

individuals with respect to election-related activity.
As others have chronicled in detail, this different
treatment included both prohibitions on campaign
contributions by such legal entities as well as,
more recently, prohibitions on such entities expending funds on certain kinds of election-related speech
made independently of candidates and political parties.66 While the stated reasons for such rules have
varied, the courts have generally identified the
greatest concern as having been that corporations
could use the vast financial resources they had accumulated in part because of the legal benefits they
enjoy to greatly distort electoral outcomes.67
Whether such different treatment was constitutional, however, was unsettled for many years. In
a case of first impression involving voting on a referendum, as opposed to on candidates, the Supreme
Court concluded that limits on corporate funding of
speech relating to the referendum were in fact
unconstitutional.68 While there were some unusual
aspects of the First National Bank v. Bellotti case,
including the clear intent of the legislature to silence
the voices of certain corporations with respect to a
specific issue, the decision soon came to be interpreted as extending constitutional protection to all
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corporate-funded speech in the lobbying context.69
Even with this interpretation, however, the Court
concluded in Taxation with Representation that
the congressional limit on charities engaging in lobbying was permitted for the reasons already discussed, without even mentioning Bellotti.70
When faced with the prohibition of corporate
funding for certain speech relating to candidates,
however, the Supreme Court initially concluded in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce that
such a prohibition was constitutional for essentially the primary reason it deemed legislatures
had enacted such prohibitions in the first place:
the potentially distorting effects of corporationaccumulated wealth on elections.71 It reached this
conclusion despite the fact that it also noted that
the only governmental interest that was sufficiently
important to justify such a limit was combating corruption or the appearance of corruption.72 The
Court reconciled those two positions by interpreting
that latter interest as encompassing the distortion
concern, but only over the vigorous dissent of a
minority of the Court on that point.73 While
acknowledging the tension of this decision with Bellotti, the Court concluded (as the Court in Bellotti
had noted) that candidate elections were a different
context from ballot initiatives and raised different,
legitimate governmental concerns.74 The Court subsequently carved out a limited exception in MCFL
for certain tax-exempt nonprofit organizations
funded solely by individual contributions, as noted
above, but otherwise left Austin intact for almost
twenty-five years.75
In Citizens United, the Court revisited this issue
and overruled Austin.76 While Citizens United was
a tax-exempt, although non-charitable, nonprofit
organization, it could not take advantage of the
MCFL exception because it received some (forprofit) corporate funding.77 The Court’s decision
did not, however, merely expand the MCFL exception to encompass a broader range of nonprofit
organizations. The Court instead held that corporate
speech—regardless of the type of corporation
involved—was subject to the same level of protection as individual speech even in the context of
candidate-related speech because what mattered
for First Amendment purposes was the speech, not
the identity of the speaker.78 The decision may not
have been as flat-footed as it first appears, however,
because the Court did leave open the possibility that
some characteristics of the speaker—such as
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whether it is a foreign entity—might still provide
a permissible basis for differentiation.79
As the Bellotti decision indicates, the Court’s
focus on the speech rather than the speaker was
not completely new, but the Citizens United decision appeared to take it to its logical extreme.
Even the Court’s slight hedging with respect to foreign entities could be based on the view that the
government might be able to demonstrate that
such speakers create a sufficiently high risk of
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such
corruption to justify restricting their speech. There
was no suggestion in the opinion, however, that differential treatment of nonprofit organizations generally, or charities specifically, is constitutionally
permissible.
B. Likely immediate effect on charity
lobbying limits
Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the Citizens United decision throws the existing federal
tax law limits on lobbying by charities into immediate doubt for several reasons. First, the Supreme
Court in Citizens United did not discuss Taxation
with Representation, much less indicate that the latter’s holding might no longer be valid. Second, the
Court has relied on the ‘‘alternate channel’’ reasoning of Taxation with Representation in other contexts and did not mention or discuss those
precedents, much less suggest that they might now
be in question (nor did the Citizens United dissent).80 Third, the Court may have been motivated
in part by an underlying concern that the members
69
See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n,
447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980).
70
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71
Austin, 494 U.S. at 659–60.
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Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
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See id. at 904–07.
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of Congress enacted the election law rules at issue
to protect their own positions, to the detriment of
our democratic political system.81 There is no indication that the Court has a similar concern with
respect to the federal tax law provisions. Fourth,
while the Court has varied significantly with respect
to the degree of deference it shows to Congress in
the election-law area, it has consistently showed
significant deference to Congress when it comes
to tax law even when addressing constitutional challenges.82 Finally, and as noted previously, the
Supreme Court in Taxation with Representation
relied on the fact that charities receive significant
‘‘subsidies’’ through the federal tax laws and thus
it was permissible for Congress to limit the use of
those subsidies, even with respect to speech.83 For
these reasons, early commentators have generally
concluded that the federal tax law prohibition on
election-related speech by charities is still good
law.84
With respect to the last reason, at least one commentator has raised the issue of whether the Court’s
dismissal of arguments that the various state-law
benefits provided to corporations justified the prohibition on certain election-related speech may undermine the subsidy argument relied upon by the Court
in Taxation with Representation.85 Seth Korman
notes that the Court in Citizens United appeared to
agree with the point made in Austin that ‘‘[s]tate
law grants corporations special advantages,’’ but
then invoked the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by concluding ‘‘the State cannot exact as the
price of those special advantages the forfeiture of
First Amendment rights.’’86 The Court did not, however, identify those benefits as a ‘‘subsidy’’ or otherwise address the reasoning in Taxation with
Representation that when a subsidy, as opposed to
some other type of government-conferred advantage, is at issue then the government may constitutionally control what type of speech that subsidy
supports. Moreover, it is not clear whether the
Court in Citizens United even agreed with this ‘‘special advantages’’ point or simply took the position
that even if it was true, it was insufficient to justify
the prohibition. Under any conditions, both because
the Court did not identify these advantages as equivalent to a subsidy and for the other reasons already
listed, it appears at best premature to predict the
demise of Taxation with Representation.
There are, however, two reasons why the Citizens
United decision could still impact the limits on lob-
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bying by charities. The first reason is simply that it
is difficult if not impossible to predict the likely
ramifications of this decision so soon after its issuance. Not only its holding but also its reasoning will
provide fodder for legal challenges and court decisions for many years. It would be an impossible
task to be accurate in predicting all of its possible
ramifications or even all of its implications in this
particular area.
There is a second and perhaps more troubling
reason why Citizens United could affect lobbying
limits. The Court explicitly rejected the argument
that the prohibition on corporate electioneering
should be upheld because corporations have the
alternative of engaging in election-related speech
through a separately segregated fund, commonly
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known as a political action committee or PAC.87 It
found that ‘‘[a] PAC is a separate association from
the corporation. So the PAC exemption from [the]
expenditure ban . does not allow corporations to
speak.’’88 The Court also concluded that even if
PACs could be viewed as somehow allowing a corporation to speak, they were not sufficient to resolve
the constitutional concern because ‘‘PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.’’89 Those
‘‘extensive regulations’’ include the need to appoint
a treasurer, maintain certain records, make certain
government filings, publicly disclose contributor
and expenditure information, and accept contributions only from certain sources and then only up
to a certain amount per source.90 At first glance,
the burdens that so troubled the Citizens United
majority seem similar to the burdens faced by charities seeking to engage in lobbying through a
501(c)(4) affiliate.
While the Court had raised similar concerns in
the MCFL case, in Citizens United it omitted two
caveats to this conclusion that it had included in
MCFL. First, in Citizens United the Court did not

mention the limits on the sources and amounts of
contributions to independent PACs, limits that
were essential to the critical fifth vote in MCFL
( Justice O’Connor), where the Court held the PAC
alternative to be unconstitutionally burdensome.91
This omission may have been intentional because,
given the Court’s reasoning in Citizens United, it
appears that such limits are unconstitutional with
respect to contributions to PACs that operate independently of candidates.92 Second, in finding the
PAC alternative insufficient the Court did not, as it
had in MCFL, drop a footnote explicitly distinguishing the tax subsidy situation addressed in Taxation
with Representation.93 That latter omission may,
however, simply reflect the fact that in MCFL the
government explicitly relied on TWR.94 In contrast,
in Citizens United neither the government nor Citizens United even cited TWR, nor did any of the
numerous amici.95 It would therefore be unwise to
read too much into these omissions. Nevertheless,
they do at least suggest that administrative burdens,
such as disclosure and recordkeeping requirements,
placed on alternate channels for speech supported
by non-subsidized funds may at some point become
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unconstitutionally heavy even in the absence of any
actual limits on the raising or use of such funds.96
To determine what the ramifications of Citizens
United in this respect are likely or, more importantly, should be, requires a more in-depth consideration of the issues raised by granting First
Amendment protection to speech funded by institutions and not just speech funded by individuals.

III. INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Scholars have wrestled for a number of years
with the issue of whether and to what extent the
First Amendment’s free speech protection extends
to speech by institutions as opposed to speech by
individuals. Even those highly critical of such an
extension have recognized that, at least in some circumstances, speech directly made by institutions
deserves some level of constitutional protection.97
While the Court in Citizens United took a firm position on this issue, it is worth considering the possible different approaches to the threshold issue of
whether speech by institutions is constitutionally
protected at the highest level—i.e., restrictions on
such speech subject to strict scrutiny—and the
related issue of whether spending on speech as
well as speech itself is so protected. This is a worthwhile exercise because it reveals that, even if one
believes the Court adopted the wrong position in
Citizens United, there are persuasive alternate
grounds for concluding that lobbying by charities
should still usually receive the highest level of
First Amendment protection. There are also strong
arguments for concluding that charities are engaged
in speech when they use non-deductible funds for
lobbying, even if one is generally skeptical of the
argument that money constitutes speech under the
First Amendment. Only after consideration of these
threshold issues can the impact of Citizens United
on charities and lobbying be accurately evaluated.
A. Threshold issues
The two threshold issues relating to Citizens
United are the extent to which the First Amendment
protects speech by institutions, as opposed to individuals, and, if such protection exists, whether it
extends to the use of money to support such speech.
Is speech by institutions protected? The language of the Court’s opinion in Citizens United

could leave the impression that protection of institutional speech is an all-or-nothing proposition: either
that speech has the full protection of the First
Amendment, or it is deserving of no such protection.98 That impression is incorrect, as the many
scholars who have considered the issue of institutional rights have explored. There are a number of
options with respect to varying the strength of that
protection. One obvious option would be provide
a weaker level of protection for all institutions.99
Another option would be to differentiate among
types of institutions, perhaps finding strong, weak,
or no protection depending on institutional characteristics.100
To make such choices requires, however, a theory
for why First Amendment protection extends to
institutions. While there are numerous candidates,
three approaches cover most of the landscape.
First, the theory could be that freedom of speech
is solely an individual right and so only speech by
an individual is constitutionally protected. Even
that approach does not leave all institutional speech
unprotected, however, for individuals often speak
indirectly by hiring others—public relations firms,
law firms, etc.—to speak on their behalf. But in
all of these instances both the speech itself and the
funds to pay for its development and communication come from an individual source. For this reason, the speech is attributed to the individual and
it is because of that attribution it is protected,
although the immediate source may be an institution.
Another option would be to view protection for
institutional speech as, at least in some instances,
derivative of protection for individual speech.
Under this approach, the level of protection for
institutional speech would depend on the strength
of that speech’s connection to the desires of individuals affiliated with that institution. At one extreme,
96
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the speech of a corporation owned by a single individual would be fully protected since that individual
would have complete control over that speech—
even though the funding for that speech may have
originated in the corporation and not in that individual, and even though, in the words of now Justice
Kagan, not requiring the corporation to distribute
its funds to the individual owner before being
used for the owner’s desired speech may result in
some ‘‘tax breaks.’’101 Also near this end of the
spectrum are MCFL-type nonprofit corporations
that are funded only by individual members who
share the corporation’s ideological goals and so
concur, at least in general terms, with its likely
speech. At the other extreme, the speech of a large
publicly traded corporation with tens of thousands
of shareholders would almost certainly not be protected, or protected relatively weakly, because the
corporation’s speech would not reflect the desires
of the corporation’s owners but, as a practical matter, the desires of the corporation’s senior management.102 Justice Stevens highlighted this example
when he pointedly noted in his Citizens United dissent that the majority never uses a multinational
business corporation in its hypotheticals.103 There
would necessarily be numerous other variations to
be considered and classified for protection purposes. As with the first approach, the protection
for the institutional speech exists because such
speech is attributed to one or more individuals, but
the link between the speech and such individual(s)
is not required to be as strong under this second
approach.
Finally, there is the approach taken by the Court
in Citizens United that would consider the protection as attaching to the speech and to the hearers
of that speech, making the nature of the speech’s
source irrelevant. In this scenario the level of protection is unaffected by the fact it is an institution
and not an individual speaking either directly or
by attribution. The strength of the government’s
interest in limiting a particular type of institution’s
speech and the fit of such a limiting regulation
might, however, depend on the nature of the
source—for example, whether the institution is controlled by foreign individuals or entities, or whether
the institution is the beneficiary of significant government contracts.104
Why do these different approaches matter in the
context of charities and lobbying? Because even if
one disagrees with the Supreme Court’s holding in
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Citizens United on this point, the charities most
likely to be affected by the current limits on charity
lobbying—and therefore most likely to need to take
advantage of the alternate channel to speak provided
by a non-charitable, tax-exempt organization—are
those akin to the MCFLs of the world for reasons
detailed below. Unless one takes the position that
only speech by institutions that is protected by the
First Amendment is speech directed and funded
by an identified individual in an essentially principal-agent relationship with the organization, the
highest level of First Amendment protections
should therefore extend to charity lobbying that
exceeds the existing limits. My view is that this
extreme, principal-agent position is untenable constitutionally because it would undermine the freedom of association under the First Amendment by
allowing government to sharply limit the ability of
individuals to gather together to engage in collectively desired speech.105
It appears that the charities most likely to be
affected by the current lobbying limits are those
akin to the MCFLs of the world for several reasons.
First, charities that are most similar to for-profit
businesses in that they rely heavily on fees as
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opposed to contributions for their financial support
are unlikely to bump up against the limits because
such charities—e.g., colleges, universities, and
other schools; hospitals and health care entities;
child care centers; retirement communities—focus
the vast majority of their activities on providing
the services for which they are paid. Whatever lobbying they engage in is therefore almost certainly
going to be an insubstantial part of their activities
or, if they have made the election to be subject to
the alternate expenditure limits, comfortably
below those limits since they are based on a sliding
scale tied to overall exempt purpose expenditures.106 Second, charities that rely primarily on
donations are unlikely to engage in lobbying, particularly with respect to controversial issues, unless
they are confident the vast majority of their donors
would be comfortable with them doing so.107
Indeed, most of the charities that engage in substantial lobbying appear both to highlight their advocacy efforts to their supporters and to seek to
involve their supporters in those efforts.108 Finally,
in practice the actual charities with non-charitable,
tax-exempt affiliates engaged in lobbying generally
fit the MCFL model in that the individual supporters
of these charities (and their affiliates) are well
aware, and supportive, of these organizations’ public policy agendas.109 Besides Taxation with Representation, common examples are the American
Civil Liberties Foundation and the ACLU, Focus
on the Family and the Focus on the Family Action
(recently renamed CitizenLink), and the Natural
Resources Defense Council and the NRDC Action
Fund.110 The IRS has itself noticed this trait.111
Such charities are not, of course, limited to
accepting contributions from individuals but may
also be supported by other institutions, thereby differentiating them from the MCFLs of the world. To
the extent such support leads to the charity (and its
non-charitable affiliate) speaking derivatively for
such institutions as opposed to for like-minded individuals, the argument for the highest level of First
Amendment protection for such charity speech
becomes significantly weaker, if one disagrees
with the Supreme Court’s position in Citizens
Untied (and in Bellotti). A different, lower level of
First Amendment protection therefore would be justified for institutionally supported 501(c)(3)/
501(c)(4) pairings under the derivative speech
model. The vast majority of such pairings, however,
do not appear to be vulnerable to such a differenti-
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ation. It therefore appears that the strict scrutiny
level of First Amendment speech protection should
generally extend to lobbying by such entities even
absent the holdings in Citizens United and Bellotti.
Is money speech? A second threshold issue is
whether whatever level of protection exists constitutionally for institutional speech extends to speechrelated spending by institutions. The question can
be divided into two parts. First, there is spending
that pays for speech, in that the speech would not
occur at the same volume or effectiveness absent
the spending.112 One of the simplest examples of
the former role of money is buying a
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megaphone—the speech could still occur without
the megaphone, but it will be heard by a larger audience if the speaker can spend money on amplification. As for the latter role, consider the difference
between a message crafted by an individual and
one crafted by an experienced public relations
firm. Again, the speech occurs in either instance,
but the ability to hire the firm will usually enhance
the speech’s effectiveness.
Second, there is the more controversial assertion
that the very act of spending can itself be speech.
The most significant but not universally accepted
example of such speech is campaign contributions,
where the very act of making a contribution to the
candidate or political party of one’s choice could
be viewed as speech, and not merely as a means
of facilitating speech by the recipient. Such spending is currently deemed by the Supreme Court to
have less protection than spending on the spender’s
own speech, however, if only because while the act
of contributing is deemed to have substantial
expressive value, the amount of a contribution is
deemed to have significantly less such speechrelated value (and so less protection).113
Whatever the merit or lack thereof of the second
issue, for the limitation on charities engaging in lobbying it is the first issue that is key. There is little
doubt that lobbying, as well as other forms of advocacy, is facilitated by the ability to spend. Furthermore, the actual cost of lobbying will vary
depending on whether pre-tax or after-tax funds
must be used (i.e., whether contributions to the
organization that are used for lobbying will be tax
deductible for the donors). The effect of the existing
limits on charity lobbying, along with certain other
federal tax provisions relating to lobbying, is, for
the most part, to require the use of after-tax funds
for lobbying by sharply limiting the amount of lobbying by charities (i.e., organizations eligible to
receive tax deductible contributions), by denying a
business expense deduction for (or imposing a tax
on) dues or contributions used for lobbying expenditures by trade associations, and denying a business
expense deduction for direct expenditures by businesses on most forms of lobbying.114
Even if spending itself is not a sufficiently
expressive activity to merit the highest level of
First Amendment protection, spending on speech
does merit such protection. Speech is possible,
and even high volume and effective speech is possible, without spending money, but it is much easier to
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engage in widespread and effective speech if funds
can be spent on developing and promulgating that
speech. Prohibiting or limiting the use of funds on
speech therefore can significantly hinder the reach
and effectiveness of that speech for those who
lack non-monetary advantages—such as a high public profile—that can overcome such a prohibition or
limit. Furthermore, coming together to speak
through a formal organization—i.e., through an
institution—and so pooling resources would appear
to be the best way for like-minded individuals of
limited means to enhance their speech through
spending.
Moreover, those who reject the highest level of
First Amendment protection even for spending on
speech generally support that position by raising
concerns regarding the effect of money on our political system, both as a corrupting influence and as a
vehicle for unequal levels of influence. For example, in his much-cited essay criticizing the Supreme
Court’s strict scrutiny protection of election-related
spending in Buckley v. Valeo, Judge J. Skelly
Wright based his objections in significant part on
the problematic effect of disparities in financial
resources on political outcomes.115 With respect to
the corrupting effect of money, such worries are
not as heightened in the lobbying context where
even supporters of lesser protection for electionrelated spending concede there is not the same
risk of government official corruption or appearance
of corruption.116 That is, even if one believes that
restrictions on spending for election-related speech
should be subject to a lower level of scrutiny
because of the corrupting effect of wealth on elections (contrary to the holding of the Court in Citizens United), that reasoning does not apply as
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strongly to lobbying.117 With respect to unequal levels
of influence, while greater financial resources almost
certainly lead to greater influence over legislation,
the effect is likely more muted than in the election
context if only because the decision makers for legislation as opposed to for elections—elected officials as
opposed to voters—are more aware of the potential
distortions created by unequal financial resources.118
Speech, including lobbying and therefore spending on speech by the charities most likely to run up
against the lobbying limits should therefore be protected by the First Amendment at the highest
level—i.e., requiring strict scrutiny. At the same
time, however, the previous holding by the Supreme
Court that the government is permitted to distinguish
between types of speech when providing even an
indirect subsidy through the tax laws, is still valid
even in the wake of Citizens United for the reasons
already discussed. The remaining question is therefore what burdens may be imposed on charities to
ensure they primarily use only after-tax dollars
(i.e., funds for which the donors have not received
a tax deduction) to engage in the affected speech.
B. Alternate channels: Charities and lobbying
and beyond
As noted previously, the greatest constitutional
issue raised by the Citizens United decision for the
charity lobbying limits is the Court’s strongly worded
dismissal of the government’s argument that the ability to form a political committee or PAC provided a
sufficient alternate channel for Citizens United’s
speech. The first part of this dismissal provides:
Section 441b [of 2 U.S.C.] is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a
PAC created by a corporation can still speak.
A PAC is a separate association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from x 441b’s
expenditure ban, x 441b(b)(2), does not allow
corporations to speak.119
On its face this language would seem to foreclose
the argument that an ‘‘alternate channel’’ would be sufficient to overcome First Amendment concerns relating
to speech regardless of the nature of the speaker or the
ease of creating and administering such an alternate
channel. Yet both this passage and the rest of the Court’s
opinion in Citizens United lack a key element found
not only in Taxation with Representation, but also in
other cases relying on Taxation with Representation’s
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reasoning. That element is a government-provided
financial ‘‘subsidy’’ that, absent the speech limitation
at issue, would necessarily support certain speech.
While it has been argued that all corporations enjoy
an effective subsidy by virtue of their special legal status, the Supreme Court did not appear to accept that
argument in Citizens United.120 In Taxation with Representation, however, the Court found a subsidy to be
clearly present through the charitable contribution
deduction that, for at least purposes of determining
the effect of the First Amendment, was analogous to
direct government funding. For the reasons already discussed, a sub silentio overruling of Taxation with Representation and its progeny seems unlikely.121
This language does, however, suggest a more rigid
conceptualization of the alternate channel approach
when strict scrutiny applies. As developed by the
Supreme Court in Taxation with Representation and
subsequent cases, it is not completely clear to what
extent Congress may burden the ability of the subsidized entity to speak through another (non-subsidized)
entity. Or to look at it from another perspective, it is
not clear what type of relationship between the subsidized entity and the non-subsidized entity must be
allowed to exist for the first entity’s First Amendment
speech rights to be vindicated through the latter entity.
While the Court held in FCC v. League of Women
Voters that an absolute prohibition on a relationship
with another, non-subsidized entity that engages in
the otherwise barred speech is not permitted, the
Court’s other decisions leave unclear what level of
restriction short of an absolute bar is permitted.122
As described previously, in Taxation with Representation both the majority opinion in a footnote
and Justice Blackmun’s concurrence appeared to
be of the view that a (subsidized) charity must be
able to have a fairly close relationship with a
(non-subsidized) affiliate for the charity’s First
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Amendment rights to be vindicated.123 Yet in Rust v.
Sullivan, the Court found a relatively strong level of
separation to be permissible, although that case also
involved a government interest in the speech at issue
not being attributed to the government.124 The lower
courts have similarly wrestled with what level of
separation—ultimately, what conditions—may be
imposed on such relationships without crossing
into unconstitutional territory.125
While not directly on point because of the lack of
a subsidy, the holding in Citizens United strongly
suggests that the burden on the ability of a charity
or other group to speak using non-subsidized funds
must be minimal if strict scrutiny applies. For the reasons already discussed, even if one disagrees with
Citizens United’s general holding regarding the
level of protection provided to institutional speech
generally, there are strong arguments for concluding
that the highest level of protection applies to most
charities that will run up against the lobbying limits.
These positions lead to the ultimate conclusion that
all the government can require, consistent with the
First Amendment, is the degree of separation
between the charity and its non-charitable affiliate
sufficient to ensure the subsidy will not flow to the
speech at issue, but no more.
The Court’s alternate argument with respect to
PACs is also instructive on this point:
Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak—and it does not—the option
to form PACs does not alleviate the First
Amendment problems with x 441b. PACs are
burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to
administer and subject to extensive regulations.
For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer,
forward donations to the treasurer promptly, keep
detailed records of the identities of the persons
making donations, preserve receipts for three
years, and file an organization statement and
report changes to this information within 10 days.
And that is just the beginning. PACs must file
detailed monthly reports with the FEC, which
are due at different times depending on the
type of election that is about to occur: These
reports must contain information regarding the
amount of cash on hand; the total amount of
receipts, detailed by 10 different categories;
the identification of each political committee
and candidate’s authorized or affiliated committee making contributions, and any persons mak-
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ing loans, providing rebates, refunds, dividends,
or interest or any other offset to operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200; the
total amount of all disbursements, detailed by
12 different categories; the names of all authorized or affiliated committees to whom expenditures aggregating over $200 have been made;
persons to whom loan repayments or refunds
have been made; the total sum of all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts
and obligations, and the settlement terms of
the retirement of any debt or obligation.
PACs have to comply with these regulations
just to speak. This might explain why fewer
than 2,000 of the millions of corporations in
this country have PACs. PACs, furthermore,
must exist before they can speak. Given the
onerous restrictions, a corporation may not
be able to establish a PAC in time to make
its views known regarding candidates and
issues in a current campaign.
Section 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech.126
This argument strengthens the position that the measures required to prevent such subsidies from funding
certain speech must not substantially burden the ability of the same association of individuals to use nonsubsidized funds for such speech. In this tax context
it therefore supports the IRS’s decision to require, in
almost all instances, no more than what is minimally
necessary to ensure financial separation between section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations and their noncharitable but still tax-exempt affiliates.127 Until the
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Citizens United decision, however, this IRS position
was arguably only a prudential measure in that more
burdensome restrictions on the use by a charity of a
non-charitable affiliate might have provided grounds
for a constitutional challenge that possibly could succeed. With the Citizens United decision, such a challenge is not only more likely but would seem to have
a higher chance of success.
This conclusion leads to two important ramifications in the federal tax context. First, it suggests
that the few instances where the IRS has imposed a
restriction that goes beyond what is required for
financial separation purposes may have heightened
constitutional vulnerability in the wake of Citizens
United. One such context is the IRS conclusion that
any communication by a charity leader in an ‘‘official’’ publication or forum of the charity will be
attributed to the charity, regardless of the source of
funding for such communication.128 While part of
the rationale for this rule may be the difficulty of valuing the ‘‘halo effect’’ resulting from the charity
leader speaking through an official charity outlet,
the IRS appears to rely primarily on a conclusion
that in this instance attribution to the charity is
required regardless of the amount paid by a noncharity source.129 Given Citizens United, such an ‘‘attribution’’ approach—when no subsidized funds are
used for the speech at issue—may be problematic.
Similarly, some of the affiliated group rules provided
in the existing regulations applicable to charities that
have chosen the elective, bright line limits for lobbying may also now be constitutionally vulnerable.130
Second, this conclusion calls into question the
constitutionality of proposals to place significantly
greater administrative burdens on non-charitable
tax-exempt organizations, such as the proposed disclosure, recordkeeping, and other administrative
requirements for such entities that engage in certain
types of speech found in many of the post-Citizens
United legislative proposals.131 While a recent challenge to the existing PAC administrative requirements failed at the federal appellate level, that
decision does not necessarily protect any additional
requirements that Congress may choose to
impose.132 And while the existing law and pending
proposals primarily target candidate-related election communications, not lobbying, they could
impact the use of non-charitable affiliates for lobbying if such affiliates also engage in candidaterelated speech as well. Citizens United strongly
suggests that if strict scrutiny applies to restrictions
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on charities engaging in lobbying through noncharitable affiliates—which I argue it does even if
one disagrees with the main holding in Citizens
United—then such administrative burdens are at a
minimum constitutionally vulnerable.
One possible solution to this tension would be to
adjust the existing categories of tax-exempt organizations that permit a single organization to engage in
both (unlimited) lobbying and (as a secondary activity) candidate-related communications and other activities. Currently numerous tax-exempt organizations,
including section 501(c)(4) advocacy groups, section
501(c)(5) labor organizations, and section 501(c)(6)
trade associations, operate under this regime. Section
501(c) could be modified, however, to permit such
organizations to engage in unlimited lobbying (in furtherance of their social welfare, labor, or industry
purposes) while requiring that all candidate-related
activities occur in a separate entity that while also
tax-exempt could be subject to more extensive disclosure and other administrative obligations, as is the
case with the current section 527 organizations. This
resolution still requires, however, that the burden of
creating a separate, political organization be minimal,
and so does not resolve the issue of whether such disclosure and administrative obligations might, at some
point, become unconstitutionally burdensome.
C. Ramifications beyond the federal tax rules
As noted previously, the holding in Taxation with
Representation has been relied on in cases outside
of the federal tax limits on speech by charities that
raise unconstitutional conditions. Besides Rust v.
Sullivan, there is pending litigation regarding legal
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assistance programs that receive federal funds and
the speech-related limits placed on the use of private
funds by those programs,133 as well as litigation
regarding AIDS prevention programs that receive
federal funds and the speech-related limits placed
on the private use of funds by those programs.134
These cases have generally involved direct subsidies from the federal government, usually in the form
of grants, as opposed to the indirect subsidies provided to charities through the Internal Revenue
Code. This difference has at times raised the additional issue of whether the organizations receiving
the subsidies—usually tax-exempt organizations,
and often charities—could be perceived by the public
as speaking on behalf of the government or being
paid to communicate a government-favored message
and so a greater level of separation between their subsidized and non-subsidized speech can be required
constitutionally so as not to confuse the public
regarding what the government is saying or undermine the government’s desired message.135 Not all
direct subsidies necessarily involve a government-favored message, however, so at least outside of that
context the ramifications of Citizens United would
appear to be similar for charities seeking to engage
in lobbying with non-subsidized funds.
More specifically, if strict scrutiny applies to government attempts to limit the use by charities of nonsubsidized funds for lobbying, for the same reasons
this level of scrutiny should also apply to government
attempts to limit the use of non-subsidized funds by
grant-receiving entities for various forms of speech.
As with the charities that are most likely to run up
against the lobbying limits, such entities are often (although not always) ideologically committed groups
heavily supported by individuals who agree with the
ideological positions taken. If this level of scrutiny
applies, the consideration of PACs in Citizens United
suggests that any burdens placed on the use of nonsubsidized funds that go beyond what is absolutely
necessary to ensure the proper use of the subsidized
funds will be at least constitutionally suspect. Such
burdens have included requiring the hiring of separate
staff and the use of physically separate facilities.
Unless these burdens are necessary to prevent the attribution of the speech at issue to the government, a separate concern that may justify them,136 such measures
appear to go beyond what is permitted under the First
Amendment in the wake of Citizens United.
More fundamentally, Citizens United may provide
a catalyst for renewed consideration of the unconstitu-
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tional conditions doctrine not just in the charity speech
context but in the subsidy situation more broadly.
Such renewed consideration is far from certain, but
the continued confusion over when a condition that
infringes on constitutional rights—particularly the
right to free speech—is unconstitutional indicates
that such consideration is still needed. One possible
approach would be to consider whether the underlying
purpose of the subsidy should be the controlling factor, with the constitutionality of the speech-related
condition turning on whether that condition has a sufficient relationship to accomplishing that purpose.137
Such an approach would have potentially broad
ramifications, including in the charity lobbying context. The question in that context would become
whether the purpose for the charitable contribution
deduction would be frustrated by permitting charities to engage in unlimited lobbying. Indeed, there
is a strong case to be made that it was exactly this
concern that motivated Congress when it enacted
the initial charity lobbying limit because the (albeit
very limited) legislative history indicates that Congress felt charity lobbying could be co-opted by private interests and serving private interests is
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fundamentally at odds with the public benefitting
nature of the organizations Congress has identified
as eligible for deductible charitable contributions.138 The problem with the limit as enacted,
however, is that it goes well beyond this private
interest concern. Moreover, the subsequent development of the private benefit doctrine indicates that
the blunt instrument of a general lobbying limitation
is not needed to address this private interest issue.139
Interestingly, the prohibition on candidaterelated political activity by charities may pass muster under this refinement of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. That is because supporting or
opposing candidates for election would generally
appear to have a much greater private interest serving aspect—that is the interest of the candidate in
obtaining the desired office—than most lobbying
efforts.140 Whether the vagueness of the existing
definition for what is prohibited candidate-related
activity would raise a separate constitutional issue
is not, however, addressed by this refinement.141

CONCLUSION
A careful reading of Citizens United strongly
suggests that the existing limits on lobbying by
charities continue to be valid. Those limits rest on
the congressional decision not to provide a ‘‘subsidy’’ for such speech through the contribution deduction available to charities, a factor not present in
Citizens United and previously held by the Supreme
Court to provide a sufficient basis for such limits.
Similarly, the constitutional requirement that charities have an alternate channel for engaging in lobbying beyond the limits appears to still be intact.
What Citizens United may change is the extent to
which the government may burden the ability to create that alternate channel, beyond what is absolutely
necessary to ensure financial separation. While the

IRS has historically been careful to keep that burden
light, its position has arguably been primarily a
pragmatic one designed to avoid constitutional litigation that would likely consume significant resources it could more productively use elsewhere even if
it ultimately prevailed. Now, however, the risk of
losing such litigation appears to be significantly
increased. Moreover, both some of the IRS’s current
positions and recent congressional proposals that
would impose additional burdens may also be constitutionally problematic.
Finally, this line of argument suggests that other
non-tax cases that raise similar issues may also be
impacted by Citizens United. If there is a government subsidy, it appears that the government may
still dictate what speech may—and may not—be
funded by that subsidy. The requirements the government may impose in the name of achieving this
goal may be subject to a greater constitutional scrutiny, however. Furthermore, Citizens United may
trigger further consideration of whether the unconstitutional conditions doctrine can be successfully
refined in the subsidy context. One of the ramifications of Citizens United may therefore be greater
clarity in this one corner of the otherwise murky
world of unconstitutional conditions.
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